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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






*JOMEAR K. MARTIN, Administrator for the  
Estate of AL-QUADIR WEBB,  




CITY OF NEWARK, NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
SAMUEL A. DEMAIO, As Director of the Newark Police 
Department, POLICE OFFICER KEVIN JOHNSON and 
POLICE OFFICER WYHIDI WILSON of the Newark  
Police Department, Individually and as employees of 
the Newark Police Department 
 
* (Amended pursuant to Clerk’s Order dated 7/13/18)  
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-12-cv-03592) 
District Judge:  Hon. Madeline Cox Arleo 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 29, 2018 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 





                                              
 ∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 




CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
The plaintiff, Jomear K. Martin, is the administrator of decedent Al-Quadir 
Webb’s estate.  Martin appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor 
of the City of Newark, the Newark Police Department (“NPD”), NPD Director Samuel A. 
DeMaio, and Police Officers Wyhidi Wilson and Kevin Johnson (collectively “the 
defendants”).  The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment primarily 
based on its determination that Officer Wilson acted objectively reasonably and was 
entitled to qualified immunity for his use of deadly force against Webb.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm. 
I. 
Because we write principally for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary 
to our decision.   
The parties offer competing versions of the events leading to Wilson’s use of force 
against Webb.  According to the defendants, Wilson and Johnson were in a marked police 
car parked on Clinton Avenue in Newark on October 15, 2011, when Wilson heard 
screeching tires, and both officers saw a Chrysler traveling in their direction at “a high 
rate of speed.”  Appendix (“App.”) 85.  The Chrysler drove past the officers and turned 
left onto Johnson Avenue.  Johnson made a U-turn on Clinton Avenue, turned on the 
car’s emergency lights and sirens, and followed the Chrysler.  The officers saw the 
Chrysler park in front of 25 Johnson Avenue.   
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The officers, intending to conduct a motor vehicle stop, parked on Johnson 
Avenue as well.  They observed the driver of the Chrysler, later identified as Webb, get 
out of the car and get onto the sidewalk.  Both saw Webb “holding his right hand side 
waistband area” and believed he might have been armed.  Id.  They exited the patrol car, 
and Wilson requested that Webb take his hand away from his waist.  “Webb stated, ‘Fuck 
that,’ and ran around the back of the Chrysler . . . to the driver’s side door . . . , still 
holding onto his right side.”  App. 86.  Wilson ran after Webb, yelling to see his hands.  
Webb got back into his car, and, “[a]lthough Webb tried to shut the driver’s door, Wilson 
had positioned himself between the door and the driver’s seat.”  Id. 
At the open car door, Wilson struggled to take hold of Webb’s left hand, which 
was reaching toward Webb’s right side.  Webb’s right hand reached to start the car.  
Wilson yelled: “Don’t start the car.  Let me see your hands.”  Id.  Webb responded “Fuck 
you.”  Id.  After Webb started the car, he “pressed on the gas” and “started to drive away, 
with Wilson still wedged between the open door and the driver’s seat.”  Id.  Wilson, who 
yelled at Webb to stop the car, took out his service weapon.  Webb’s car accelerated with 
some portion of the officer’s body inside of the car, pulling him down the street with the 
car.  Fearful that he would be run over, Wilson fired his gun in Webb’s direction three 
times.  The officer fell onto the street as the car continued traveling toward the cul-de-sac 
at the end of Johnson Avenue.  Webb’s car hit a parked car and flipped over, landing on 
its passenger side.1   
                                              
1 Johnson, who did not fire his gun, estimated that the incident lasted fifteen 
seconds.   
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The plaintiff advances the following version of events, as relayed by witness 
Alqumar Jones in a statement to a private investigator two weeks after the shooting.2  Ms. 
Jones saw a police car arrive on Johnson Avenue after the driver of the Chrysler was on 
the sidewalk and heard an officer say, “come here” and “that car is stolen.”  App. 1057.  
The driver responded “this is my car and I got the papers on it,” and “no, fuck you.”  Id.  
The driver then quickly reentered his car.  After Webb cursed at him, the officer’s 
demeanor changed — he approached the open driver’s side door and tried to pull the 
driver out of the Chrysler.  The officer warned Webb that he would shoot him if he turned 
the car on.  After Webb started the car, the officer leaned into the Chrysler and shot him.  
Ms. Jones stated that the officer was not dragged by the car, which only moved after the 
shots.   
Webb was shot in the back and rendered a paraplegic.  On May 22, 2014, he 
passed away.  Although Webb was charged with several offenses following the shooting, 
including possession of a weapon (a car) for an unlawful purpose and eluding arrest, the 
charges were dismissed after his death.    
A ballistics report revealed that Wilson’s weapon was no more than 96 inches 
away from Webb at the time of the shooting.  According to the defendants’ shooting 
                                              
2 The defendants’ Rule 56 Statement mentions Ms. Jones’ contradictory grand jury 
testimony, as well as Marshella Whitaker’s statement to the private investigator and 
inconsistent grand jury testimony five years later.  Because the plaintiff relies on Ms. 
Jones’ October 2011 statement, we consider only that statement for purposes of this 
appeal.  See Zaloga v. Borough of Moosic, 841 F.3d 170, 172 n.1 (3d Cir. 2016) (“For 
purposes of summary judgment, we recount the facts as alleged by the plaintiffs, 
accepting them as true and drawing all factual inferences in their favor.”).   
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reconstruction expert, the shot that struck Webb came through the driver’s side front 
window.  The expert opined that “the forward movement and acceleration of the 
[Chrysler] caus[ed] the open driver’s side front door to swing towards the closed position 
while a portion of [Officer] Wilson’s body [wa]s between the door and the chassis of the 
vehicle,” which “place[d] the muzzle of [his] firearm drawn from his duty holster on his 
left side in a position on the exterior side of the driver’s side front door window glass at 
the time of discharge while the vehicle [wa]s in motion.”  App. 995.  The expert also 
concluded that a second bullet fired by Wilson as he “separated from the vehicle due to 
its southerly acceleration” hit the rear bumper of the Chrysler.  Id.  The expert was unable 
to determine the timing of or flight path for the third bullet.  Ultimately, he concluded 
that the evidence examined was “consistent with the statement of [Officer] Wilson.”  
App. 998.   
Webb filed a complaint against the officers, DeMaio, NPD, and Newark.  After 
Webb’s passing, Martin was substituted as the plaintiff.  An amended complaint was 
filed, raising the following causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New Jersey law:  
claims against the officers for excessive force (count two), and the remaining defendants 
for failure to adequately train and supervise (count four) and for their policies and 
practices that permit the use of excessive force (count one); against the officers and the 
remaining defendants, vicariously, for assault and battery (count five); against Newark, 
NPD, and DeMaio for negligent hiring and retention (count six); and against all of the 
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defendants for wrongful death (count seven).3  The defendants successfully moved for 
summary judgment.   
The District Court held that Wilson was entitled to qualified immunity because his 
use of deadly force was neither objectively unreasonable nor against clearly established 
law.  Consequently, it dismissed the derivative § 1983 claims against Newark and 
DeMaio.  “Given the reasonableness” of Wilson’s use of force, the court found him 
immune — and Newark, NPD, and DeMaio derivatively immune — from liability under 
the New Jersey Tort Claims Act as to the state law claims against those defendants.  App. 
15, 18.  The court then dismissed all of the claims against Johnson due to his lack of 
involvement in, or responsibility to prevent, the force used against Webb; the § 1983 
claims against DeMaio due to his lack of personal involvement in the shooting and the 
lack of a constitutional violation by Wilson; and the § 1983 claims against NPD, as it is 
an improper defendant.4  The plaintiff now appeals the order granting summary 
judgment.  
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 
and 1367, and this Court’s appellate jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
                                              
3 The plaintiff also asserted that Newark, NPD, and DeMaio violated § 1983 and 
the New Jersey Constitution by restraining his freedom during his hospitalization (count 
three).  The court granted summary judgment on that claim after finding that the plaintiff 
had abandoned it and, alternatively, failed to present evidence as to its essential elements.  
The plaintiff does not challenge that dismissal on appeal, so we will not address it.  Barna 
v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2017).   
4 The plaintiff does not challenge the ruling as to NPD on appeal, so we do not 
address it.  Barna, 877 F.3d at 145.   
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exercise plenary review over the grant of summary judgment, Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 
271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002), which is warranted if the movant demonstrates “that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  As part of this review, this Court ascertains whether, as gleaned 
from “the facts and inferences from them [viewed] in the light most favorable to” the 
plaintiff, there is a genuine issue of material fact.  Crissman v. Dover Downs Entm’t Inc., 
289 F.3d 231, 233 (3d Cir. 2002).  A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” and material if it “might 
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).   
III.  
A.  
We address the § 1983 claim against Wilson first.  Qualified immunity operates to 
protect a public official from civil liability — even litigation — so long as he did not 
“violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.”  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).  To determine the doctrine’s applicability, a court 
must ascertain whether the facts shown by the plaintiff “make out a violation of a 
constitutional right” and whether that right “was clearly established at the time of 
[Wilson’s] alleged misconduct.”  Id. at 232 (quotation marks omitted).  A right is clearly 
established if precedent places its existence beyond debate, such that only “the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” are not shielded by qualified 
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immunity.  Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quotation marks omitted).  In 
determining that right, we must keep in mind the Supreme Court’s repeated directives 
“not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality” and instead conduct 
this analysis “in light of the specific context of the case.”  Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 
305, 308 (2015) (quotation marks omitted).   
Many of the facts in this case are disputed.5  Yet, when those disputes are viewed 
in the plaintiff’s favor, the “specific context of the case,” id., is as follows.  Prior to the 
shooting, Webb had cursed at Wilson and “attempted to walk away from [him] to avoid a 
confrontation,” quickly walking to and reentering a car that the officer referred to as 
stolen.  App. 111.  The two engaged in a struggle at the open driver’s side door, with 
Webb seated in the driver’s seat and Wilson’s hands inside of the car.  Webb ignored the 
officer’s warning that he would fire his weapon if Webb started the car.  In the light most 
                                              
5 The plaintiff challenges the application of qualified immunity in part by arguing 
that the District Court impermissibly resolved factual disputes regarding whether the 
motor vehicle stop was lawful, whether the officers reasonably believed Webb was 
armed, and whether Wilson was being dragged by the car when he shot Webb.  But those 
facts are not material to our conclusion.  The plaintiff also argues that the court 
erroneously found uncontested Wilson’s position (between the car and the car door) at 
the time of the shooting.  The only evidence the plaintiff offered otherwise was a 
statement by Johnson that Wilson was “half inside the driver’s side window” during the 
struggle.  App. 1039.  But Johnson ultimately testified that he could not recall if the 
struggle took place “in the window or partially with the door being opened,” but that it 
could have been either one.  App. 360-61.  In light of Wilson’s testimony, Jones’ 
statement, and the expert report, all of which place Wilson at the open car door, 
Johnson’s equivocal testimony does not create a genuine issue of fact.  We note that, 
contrary to the District Court’s determination, the parties do dispute whether the car was 
moving at the time of the shooting.  We view that fact in the plaintiff’s favor and proceed 
with our analysis assuming that the car had not yet moved when Wilson fired his gun.   
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favorable to the plaintiff, Wilson shot Webb, at the earliest, “[a]s Mr. Webb turned the 
key in the ignition.”  App. 111. 
We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Wilson’s conduct was 
objectively reasonable and not contrary to clearly established law.  “The reasonableness 
of a seizure is assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances,” and often, as here, “a 
proper assessment of the threat of injury . . . is crucial to identifying the magnitude of the 
governmental interests at stake.”  Johnson v. City of Phila., 837 F.3d 343, 349-50 (3d Cir. 
2016).  Wilson was faced with an erratic and noncompliant driver who disregarded his 
explicit warning not to start the car, despite Wilson’s proximity to, and presence (of at 
least his hands) within, the vehicle.  Webb posed a threat to Wilson’s life:  being injured 
by a moving vehicle.  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 n.9 (2007) (noting that a 
suspect’s “flight itself” may “pose[] the threat of serious physical harm . . . to others” 
(second alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted)).  Even assuming that the car 
had not yet moved at the time of the shooting, a reasonable officer in Wilson’s position 
would have feared for his life given Webb’s bold actions.  Wilson need not have awaited 
movement of the car to protect himself.  See Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d 576, 580-81 (11th 
Cir. 2007) (holding that officer’s shooting of a mentally unstable driver who drove away 
from the officer in a stolen police car was objectively reasonable because “the law does 
not require officers in a tense and dangerous situation to wait until the moment a suspect 
uses a deadly weapon to act to stop the suspect”).   
The plaintiff advances two additional arguments to demonstrate that Wilson acted 
unreasonably:  first, that Wilson’s conduct violated the Attorney General of New Jersey 
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Guidelines, and second, that Wilson’s use of force could only have been justified if he 
“effected a legal traffic stop, proceeded with his investigation . . . in an appropriate way, 
and then act[ed] legally in his pursuit of Mr. Webb.”  Pl. Br. 26.  We reject the plaintiff’s 
first contention because, assuming the guidelines factor into this analysis, the inquiry 
pursuant to the guidelines is the same as the objective reasonableness assessment above, 
prohibiting the use of deadly force absent a reasonable belief that it is necessary to 
protect against imminent danger of death or serious injury.  We reject the plaintiff’s 
second argument because, assuming the traffic stop was unlawful, it is foreclosed by 
County of Los Angeles, California v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1547 n.*1 (2017), which 
held that an objectively reasonable use of force “may not be found unreasonable by 
reference to some separate constitutional violation.”   
Alternatively, we agree that, at a minimum, Wilson is entitled to qualified 
immunity because it was not clearly established, in October 2011, that an officer uses 
excessive force when he shoots at a driver who starts a car despite having been warned 
not to and does so while the officer is positioned between the car and its open driver’s 
side door.  The plaintiff does not point to any controlling authority or “robust consensus 
of cases of persuasive authority” that place the answer to this question beyond debate.  
Sauers v. Borough of Nesquehoning, 905 F.3d 711, 719 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting 
Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2016)).  
Instead, he points to Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), and Abraham v. Raso, 183 
F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1999), neither of which accomplishes that aim.  Garner did not concern 
the clearly defined right at issue; it only established the general principle that deadly 
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force “may not be used unless it is necessary to prevent [a suspect’s] escape and the 
officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or 
serious physical injury to the officer or others.”  Garner, 471 U.S. at 3.  The Supreme 
Court has explained that Garner does not itself “create clearly established law outside an 
obvious case.”  Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153 (quotation marks omitted).  We do not believe 
this to be such an “obvious case,” and, as explained above, the circumstances here reveal 
that a reasonable officer could have believed that Webb’s conduct posed a significant 
threat.   
Raso is likewise of little help.  First, it merely reiterated Garner’s general 
principle.  Raso, 183 F.3d at 289.  Second, in Raso, we did not render a holding 
concerning qualified immunity or, for that matter, objective reasonableness — instead, 
we reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of an officer who shot at a moving 
vehicle containing a fleeing shoplifter after finding a dispute of fact regarding whether 
the officer was in any danger at all at the time of the shooting.  Id. at 294-95.   
On the other hand, guidance from the Supreme Court reveals that officers who 
shoot suspects “set on avoiding capture through vehicular flight, when persons in the 
immediate area are at risk from that flight,” do not violate clearly established law.  
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2004).  In Brosseau, a suspect ignored an 
officer’s demands at gunpoint to exit his car and instead attempted to start the car.  Id. at 
196.  The officer shattered the driver’s car door window and struggled with him through 
the window to gain control of the car keys.  Id.  Nonetheless, the suspect started the car.  
Id.  Concerned for the safety of people nearby, the officer “jumped back” from the car as 
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it “started or shortly after it began to move” and shot at the driver.  Id. at 196-97.  The 
Supreme Court affirmed that Brosseau was entitled to qualified immunity.  Id. at 201.  
Because the plaintiff had not provided “controlling authority or a robust consensus of 
cases of persuasive authority” clearly establishing the illegality of Wilson’s conduct, the 
District Court properly concluded that the plaintiff was unable to defeat qualified 
immunity.  Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779-80 (2014) (quotation marks omitted).   
B. 
 The plaintiff also appeals the grant of summary judgment in the defendants’ favor 
on his remaining claims:  his § 1983 claims against Newark and DeMaio; his state law 
claims against Newark, NPD, DeMaio, and Wilson; and his claims against Johnson.   
Because the District Court properly concluded that Wilson’s conduct was 
objectively reasonable, and therefore did not amount to a constitutional violation of 
Webb’s rights, summary judgment in favor of Newark and DeMaio on the § 1983 claims 
against them was appropriate.  Absent an underlying constitutional violation, there can be 
no claim against Newark or DeMaio.  Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 
(3d Cir. 2010); Grazier ex rel. White v. City of Phila., 328 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 2003).   
Next, the plaintiff argues that the court’s determination that Wilson, Newark, 
NPD, and DeMaio were entitled to summary judgment on the state law claims filed 
against them cannot stand “[b]ecause this legal determination was based on facts 
inappropriately found by the court.”  Pl. Br. 43.  The plaintiff argues that the factual 
disputes he identified in the context of his excessive force claim cast doubt on the 
reasonableness of Wilson’s actions and that (unidentified) “[q]uestions exist as to 
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whether Officer Wilson’s actions were criminal, malicious, or willful.”6  Pl. Br. 44.  As 
elucidated above, the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff reveal that Wilson’s 
conduct was objectively reasonable.  Moreover, the plaintiff does not point to anything in 
the record, nor does he make an argument, to support his contention that questions exist 
as to whether Wilson acted willfully, maliciously, or criminally.   
Finally, we agree with the District Court that the claims against Johnson fail.  To 
reiterate, those claims include a § 1983 claim of excessive force, a state law claim of 
assault and battery, and a state law claim of wrongful death.  It is undisputed that Johnson 
did not use any force during the incident.  Without evidence of Johnson’s “personal 
involvement in the alleged violation,” the plaintiff’s claim that Johnson used excessive 
force must fail.  Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 291 (3d Cir. 2018).  To 
the extent the plaintiff bases his § 1983 claim against Johnson on the officer’s non-
intervention in Wilson’s use of force, that claim likewise fails, as liability on that theory 
only attaches if the relevant use of force was unlawful.  See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 
                                              
6 To the extent that the plaintiff challenges the grant of summary judgment against 
him on his negligent hiring and retention claim, we conclude that that challenge is also 
meritless.  Such an action imposes liability upon an employer “where it knew or had 
reason to know of the particular unfitness, incompetence or dangerous attributes of the 
employee and could reasonably have foreseen that such qualities created a risk of harm to 
other persons” and when the employee’s “incompetence, unfitness or dangerous 
characteristics proximately caused [the plaintiff’s] injury.”  Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 
508, 516 (N.J. 1982).  The record, which reveals no sustained allegations of excessive 
force by Wilson before the incident at issue, lacks evidence indicating Wilson’s 
dangerous attributes.  Cf. Denis v. City of Newark, 704 A.2d 1003, 1007-08 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1998) (concluding that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of 
negligent retention partly because the police officer had been “disciplined for assaultive 
behavior on defenseless citizens” twice before the pertinent assault).   
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F.3d 641, 650-52 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting holding of sister appellate courts that officers 
have “a duty to take reasonable steps to protect a victim from another officer’s use of 
excessive force” and explaining that officers may not “escape liability by turning either a 
blind eye or deaf ear to the illegal conduct of their colleagues” (emphasis added)).  
Summary judgment was warranted in Johnson’s favor on the state law claims, as the 
plaintiff has not provided evidence, nor does he argue, that Johnson intentionally acted to 
cause Webb (to fear) a harmful or offensive contact, that he touched Webb without his 
consent, Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 969 A.2d 1097, 1117 (N.J. 2009), or that a 
wrongful act by Johnson caused Webb’s death, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:31-1.  Summary 
judgment in Johnson’s favor was proper.  
IV. 
For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm.   
